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An increasing number of researchers are recognizing the importance of the role played by 
employees in maintaining the effectiveness of an information security policy. Currently, 
little research exists to validate the relationship between the actions (behaviors) taken by 
employees in response to exceptional situations (antecedents) regarding an organization’s 
information security policy, the impact (consequences) those actions have on an 
organization, and the motives that prompt those actions. When these exceptional 
situations occur, employees may feel compelled to engage in behaviors that violate the 
terms of an information security policy because strict compliance with the policy could 
cause the organization to lose revenue, reputability or some other business advantage. To 
address this issue, this research study investigated how to design an effective information 
security policy for exceptional situations in an organization. In order to achieve this goal, 
this study explored how an information security policy should be designed with the 
critical components of clarity, comprehensiveness, ease of use and flexibility, in addition 
to including provisions for the work contingencies of employees. The aim of this 
proposed study was to demonstrate how the application principles of the prima-facie, 
utilitarian and universalizability design theories can aid in designing an information 
security policy that includes these essential elements. The research study explored the 
effectiveness of the policy's design and the effect it had on employee compliance with the 
policy in exceptional situations.  A survey questionnaire was administered to a control 
group and an experimental group consisting of full-time and part-time employees who 
worked in various departments of a single organization. The survey employed a five-
point Likert-type scale. The data gathered from the questionnaire was analyzed. 
Inferential statistics used the general linear model (GLM), including the t-test, analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA), regression analysis, and factor analysis with the latest SPSS 
version computer statistical analysis program. This study built to develop a model for 
designing an effective information security policy for exceptional situations in an 
organization. Based on the analysis of fit the model for designing an effective 
information security policy for exceptional situations in an organization was determine to 
be a success model. This study should provide many opportunities for future research, as 
well as providing information security practitioners and academics a solid roadmap for 
designing effective information security policies within an organization to apply during 
exceptional situations. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
As the electronic storage of information grows increasingly prevalent because of 
advancements in technology, the need for organizations to develop and utilize 
modernized methods and systems to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(CIA) of their information assets also continues to escalate. Electronically stored 
information is susceptible to a host of new cyber threats from both insiders and outsiders 
(Dunkerley & Tejay, 2009). However, information security specialists generally agree 
that the establishment and implementation of an information security policy is one of the 
most essential factors in safeguarding an organization’s information assets (Da Veiga, & 
Eloff, 2010; Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zolait, 2009; Eloff, J., & Eloff, M., 2005; Parker, 1997; 
Straub, 1990; Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005; Warman, 1992). 
Increasingly, researchers (Siponen, & Vance, 2010; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010; 
Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005; Knapp, Morris, Marshall, & 
Anthony, 2009; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010) recognize the importance of the 
role played by employees in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of information 
systems (IS) security policies (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Karjalainen & Siponen, 
2011), particularly in the case of exceptional situations (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The issue of employee noncompliance with an information security policy is 
strongly related to the sociability of human nature (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 
2009; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Renaud, 2012). As determined by Scott, Laurie, 
Angermeier, Raymond, and Boss, (2009) as well as Bosworth and Kabay (2002), an 
information security policy induces employees to contemplate their views about their 
obligation to follow the terms of the policy in order to secure and safeguard the 
information assets of an organization. Organizations that try to compel reluctant 
employees to accept and obey an inflexible information security policy are likely to be 
met with opposition. The reasons for this opposition are because a rigorous policy tends 
to complicate an employee’s tasks and because it is human nature for an individual to 
rebel when he or she feels coerced or pressured. Consequently, employees should be able 
to easily understand and follow a clear, flexible and comprehensive information security 
policy. Depending on the factors related to clarity, comprehensiveness and ease of use 
that an organization takes into account during the policy’s development, employees may 
regard the policy as either a meaningless show of authority or a manifestation of their 
personal ideals and beliefs (Cavallari, 2011; D’Arcy, & Hovav, 2007; Smith, Winchester, 
Bunker, & Jaimeson, 2010; Workman, & Gathegi, 2007). 
Although some information security policies may prove reliable in maintaining 
the integrity of sensitive data under a routine state of affairs in the work environment, 
many organizations face the challenge of designing and enforcing an information security 
policy that employees can follow during exceptional situations. An exceptional situation 
is defined as an unforeseen business proposition or prospect that arises in organizations 
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with a fluctuant and variable outlook and that may entail employees to violate an 
information security policy in order to promote the welfare of the organization (Siponen 
& Iivari, 2006). 
 Because of the rapidly evolving nature of today’s corporate world, it is growing 
more and more common for organizations to operate in a continual state of flux as new 
technological and social concerns and circumstances steadily arise (Tidd & Bessant, 2011; 
Alaa, 2009; Patel, Eldabi, & Khan, 2010). According to Houry, (2012), these emergent 
organizations are more likely to encounter exceptional situations than businesses whose 
future outlook is generally stable (Alatalo, Oinas-Kukkonen, Kurkela & Siponen, 2002; 
Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Kingsford, 2008; Truex, Baskerville & Klein, 2001).   
When these exceptional situations occur, employees may feel compelled to engage in 
behaviors that violate the terms of an information security policy because strict 
compliance with the policy could cause the organization to lose revenue, reputability or 
some other business advantage (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). However, despite an 
employee’s favorable intentions, the outcome of his or her decisions may not always be 
advantageous for the organization. 
An organization can be defined as a business of any type and may range in size 
from small to large. Although some organizations are more likely to encounter 
unpredictable occurrences than others, the information assets of a sole proprietorship or a 
conglomerate are both exposed to the same risks based on the actions of the employees in 
regard to an information security policy when an exceptional situation does occur. For 
this reason, an information security policy that accounts for the possibility of exceptional 
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situations is important for all organizations (Hedström, Kolkowska, Karlsson, & Allen, 
2011; Siponen, Willison, Baskerville, 2008; Willison, & Warkentin, 2013). 
In essence, an information security policy is a product of how both people and 
systems are organized and managed (Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Baskerville & 
Siponen, 2002). As such, organizations need to carefully consider the design process of 
the information security policy and to thoroughly evaluate the policy's clarity, 
comprehensiveness, flexibility and ease of use to aid employees in following its terms 
when they are presented with exceptional situations. Therefore, it is crucial for 
organizations to understand the behaviors and motives of employees who intentionally 
ignore or disregard the information security policy in exceptional situations, potentially 
placing personal and organizational information at risk.  
The design and provisions of an information security policy may vary depending 
upon the nature of a particular organization or department. For instance according to 
Doherty, Anastasakis and Fulford, (2009), governments, large corporations, small 
businesses and universities are each likely to produce distinct information security 
policies that are suitable for their particular business requirements. Similarly, unique 
policies may be required by an organization’s various departments, such as human 
resources, sales, communications, marketing, accounting, customer, and information 
technology. In addition, the stipulations in an information security policy can range from 
highly detailed to loosely structured. One rule may explicitly inform an employee of the 
various steps to take or to avoid in order to prevent a breach of security while another 
rule provides only a broad observation of the risks and penalties of noncompliance. 
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These penalties or sanctions have the ability to influence the decisions that 
employees make about complying with the terms of an information security policy. When 
faced with an exceptional situation, some employees may choose to strictly comply with 
an information security policy if they feel that their job security is at risk, even if they 
believe that violating the information security policy is in the best interests of the 
organization. 
 
1.2 Research problem and argument 
 
 
The research problem was to investigate how to design effective information 
security policies for exceptional situations in an organization. Employees need guidance 
to make a decision to follow or violate an information security policy when faced with 
exceptional situations. An effective information security policy should be clear, 
comprehensive, usable, and flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of data, 
activities, and resources. It should also be designed to provide employees with guidance 
on how to handle unexpected or uncommon situations or incidents that may occur in the 
workplace. A poorly designed information security policy may provide inadequate 
protection for sensitive data or cause employees to take actions that are detrimental to the 
organization (Herath & Rao, 2009). As stated by Herath and Rao, various factors play a 
role in determining an employee's willingness to observe or abuse the terms of an 
information security policy, including intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and penalties, the 
social acceptability of a given behavior, and personal beliefs. Employees are far less 
likely to comply with an information security policy that is not clear, comprehensive, 
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flexible, and easy to understand and use. Besnard and Arief (2004) asserted that the 
interaction between employees and computers should play a more significant role in the 
design of an information security policy. Additionally, Workman, Bommer, and Straub 
(2008) argued that IS specialists still struggle with the issue of how to effectively apply 
an information security policy. Based on the research results of Workman, Bommer, and 
Straub, the primary reason for this struggle was because of the flaws in the 
methodologies used in the majority of studies that have analyzed and examined the issue 
of employee compliance. An information security policy should allow employees to 
easily comprehend, follow and observe its terms in order to assist them in making the 
appropriate decisions, regardless of their experience, intelligence or skill level.  
An information security policy should be effective and sustainable in an 
organization. As indicated by Siponen, Baskerville, & Heikka, 2006, an organization can 
help to increase the soundness of its information security program through the design and 
development of an information security policy that is clear, comprehensive, flexible and 
usable. After implementing such a policy, an organization should regularly examine, 
appraise and address any differences that subsequently occur in the security of its 
information assets (Milicevic, & Goeken, 2010). Milicevic and Goeken stated that these 
periodic assessments and revisions can help an organization to ascertain if stages of rapid 
adjustments in its structure or proceedings impact the effectiveness of its information 
security policy. 
The research argument was that an effective information security policy should be 
clear, comprehensive, flexible and usable and should take into account the work 
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contingencies of the employees of an organization. An information security policy 
requires a design process and application principles that focus on clarity, 
comprehensiveness, flexibility and usability, particularly in regard to guidelines for 
handling exceptional situations. This type of policy is more effective in maintaining the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of an organization's information assets (Siponen 
& Iivari, 2006).  
An information security policy should be flexible. The security of an 
organization’s information assets is jeopardized to varying degrees whenever an 
employee fails to comply with an information security policy. The reasons that 
employees violate the terms of an information security policy are complex and varied 
(Herath & Rao, 2009). According to Herath and Rao, a combination of social, economic 
and psychological factors affect an employee's decision-making process when 
contemplating whether to comply with or ignore the terms of an information security 
policy. In addition, employees may unintentionally violate the policy because they are not 
aware of its terms. However, of greater concern to practitioners are those instances in 
which an employee knowingly violates an information security policy, even if it is not 
done with malicious intent (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). An employee may feel that 
complying with the policy is too time-consuming, pointless or complex. These security 
breaches are especially liable to occur when an employee encounters an exceptional 
situation that necessitates a swift response (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). A degree of 
flexibility in a policy gives employees the opportunity to make choices based on response 
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time, client satisfaction, data security and other factors that are in the best interests of the 
organization.   
An information security policy should take into account the work contingencies of 
the employees of an organization. A classic professional in the field of information 
systems security, Desman (2001) argued that the effectiveness of information security 
relies more on human factors than on technological factors.  Similarly, other long-
standing industry authorities such as Gaunt (2000), as well as more contemporary experts 
(Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010), agree that the issue of employee compliance is one of the 
greatest risks to the safety of an organization’s information assets. Furthermore, the 
failure of an information security policy to take into account the risks presented by 
exceptional situations or the dynamics that influence an employee’s behavior under these 
circumstances increases the probability of insider threats. Without any guidelines to 
follow when exceptional situations arise, an employee is liable to take actions that 
compromise the CIA of an organization’s data or cause the organization to miss out on 
lucrative business prospects (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). As stated by Hadasch, Maedche 
and Mueller (2011), an employee can compromise the CIA of an organization’s 
information assets with even one careless misstep while carrying out his or her daily job 
functions. However, an information security policy must also enable employees to 
perform their prescribed duties in a methodical, efficient and timely manner in order to 
remain cost efficient (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Pahnila, Siponen, & 
Mahmood, 2007).  
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An information security policy should be usable. If employees do not comply 
with an information security policy, the safety of the organization’s information assets 
may be compromised. Oftentimes, employees feel that certain procedures in an 
information security policy hinder their ability to complete daily work tasks in a timely 
manner (Siponen & Iivari, 2006; Siponen & Vance, 2010). This mindset or belief is due 
in large part to the fact that an information security policy is too complex, rigid, unsound 
or time-consuming to obey. The issue of employee noncompliance with an information 
security policy is of fundamental importance to organizations and their information 
security experts. According to Desman (2001), the behaviors and attitudes of people are 
more closely intertwined with the field of information security than are technological or 
procedural matters (Desman, 2001; Shin, 2010). Consequently, an organization’s 
workforce poses the greatest threat to its information security (Gaunt, 1998; Warkentin, 
& Willison, 2009). 
 
1.3 Importance of research problem 
 
 
Currently, little research exists to validate the relationship between the actions 
(behaviors) taken by employees in response to exceptional situations (antecedents) 
regarding an organization’s information security policy, the impact (consequences) those 
actions have on an organization, and the motives that prompt those actions. As stated by 
Siponen and Iivari (2006), current studies overlook these important relationships. One of 
the most crucial links to examine in this chain was the connection between employees’ 
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actions and the justifications that caused the employees to behave in such a manner. Once 
understood, the correlation between these factors may assist an organization in designing 
and implementing an information security policy that is more conducive to effectively 
resolving exceptional situations, resulting in more favorable consequences for the well-
being of an organization’s information assets. As stated by Dunkerley and Tejay (2009), 
if an organization is aware of its risk factors and takes appropriate measures to alleviate 
them, it can expedite the handling of its business transactions and affairs. 
Bostrom, Gupta and Thomas (2009) argue that it is ill-advised for any 
organization to adopt an IS theory that disregards or underestimates the importance of the 
human element in regard to the security of the organization’s information assets. 
Employees are far less likely to comply with an information security policy that is 
complicated and unyielding.  
However, in order for an information security policy to gain general approval 
from management and staff, an organization needs to consider the opinions, suggestions 
and ideas of its employees during the policy’s design process (Gaunt, 2000). This enables 
the organization to create an information security policy with content that is clear, 
comprehensive and understandable. Employees can also provide valuable 
recommendations on how to develop information security procedures that can prove 
beneficial in handling exceptional situations. Numerous researchers support the belief 
that employee participation is essential, claiming that human behavior is among the top 
three concerns of an organization for enhancing the security of its information security 
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policy (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Hitchings, 1995) by 
providing employees with a sense of ownership for their input. 
Information security breaches caused directly by the failure of employees to 
comply with an information security policy represent a growing concern for 
organizations (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). As the demand for 
confidentiality and discretion in business matters continues to increase along with the 
pace of technological advancements, so too does the competitiveness among 
organizations to develop reliable information security policies. Therefore, an organization 
that gains a trustworthy reputation for consumer privacy also gains a distinct strategic 
advantage over its competitors, thereby amplifying the significance of an effective 
information security policy and making it a necessary foundation for the success of an 
organization. 
As noted by D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, (2009), between 50 to 75 percent of 
information security problems in an organization are associated with the factor of human 
involvement. However, this recognition gives researchers and practitioners no insight into 
the dynamics that cause or motivate employees to breach an information security policy. 
It is not clear whether the breaches are accidental, intentional or caused by information 
security policies that are inflexible and unclear, failing to provide employees with 
guidelines on how to handle exceptional situations. To address this lack of knowledge, 
Dutta and Roy (2008); Gonzalez and Sawicka (2002); Mishra and Dhillon (2006, June); 
Sawicka and Kopainsky, (2008, July); Stanton (2007); Van Niekerk and von Solms (2005) 
advocate the need for empirically based research studies that investigate the relationship 
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between the culture or milieu of an organization and its information system (IS), 
including the employees. 
An information security policy is the underpinning that protects an organization’s 
privileged data and secures the confidentiality of its employees' and clients' information. 
By inviting employees from various departments to participate in the design process of an 
information security policy, organizations can increase the likelihood of creating a policy 
that is easier for personnel to understand and follow and that helps to ensure employee 
compliance. Additionally, if organizations incorporate the flexibility and application 
principles of design theories into their information security policies, they can improve 
their probability of achieving a positive outcome in exceptional situations (Siponen & 
Iivari, 2006). 
A widely held conviction is that the safety of an organization’s information assets 
is dependent upon the implementation of an information security policy. However, 
developing a successful information security policy is a difficult undertaking that requires 
the consideration of many elements and dynamics (Karyda, Kiountouzis, & Kokolakis, 
2005). Employees may occasionally violate an information security policy because they 
regard it as an impediment that obstructs their workflow. In fact, many organizations fail 
to achieve the objectives they have set with the execution of their information security 
policy (Karyda et. al, 2005). It is essential for an organization’s information security 
experts to appreciate the significance of human involvement in relation to the success or 
failure of an information security policy and to consider design principles when 
developing information security policies for exceptional situations. More specifically, 
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these specialists need to comprehend how societal factors, such as the differences 
between cultures and generations, can impact the viewpoints, feelings and opinions that 
employees have toward complying with an organization’s information security policy 
(Al-Awadi, 2010). 
Despite the fact that organizations regard an information security policy as a 
necessity, the implementation of an information security policy cannot guarantee that an 
employee is going to obey it. Consequently, the purpose of this study was to address the 
impact that the information-security design process had on the employees' voluntariness 
(behavior) and the relationship between the policy's clarity, comprehensiveness, 
flexibility, usability and its effectiveness in exceptional situations. 
 
1.4 Definitions of Key Terms 
 
 
The terms that were used in this study are defined as follows. 
Information systems are defined as the deployment of information technology to collect, 
process and disseminate information in organizations and society. Employees using 
information technology are an important aspect of an information system. Information 
systems include both technological components and the humans who use them to store, 
process and distribute electronic data (Avison & Fitzgerald, 1995).  
Information Security is defined as “a well-informed sense of assurance that information 
risks and controls are in balance” (Anderson, 2003 p. 310). The goal of information 
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security is to protect business assets and reduce costs by avoiding security violations and 
reducing the negative effects they have on an organization. 
Corporate business policy is defined as a set of diverse documents regarding an 
organization's business objectives and intent to address business-related issues and to 
provide guidelines to ensure that all decisions and activities are aligned with the defined 
strategies as part of corporate governance (Wheelen & Hunger, 2008). Policies dictate 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviors within an organization, including penalties for 
violation of the policy's terms (Knapp, Marshall, Anthony, 2009). 
Information security policy is a written, living document outlining the actions and 
procedures that employees should follow in order to protect an organization’s 
information security assets (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). According to Bulgurcu et al. (2010), 
an information security policy outlines the function and tasks of employees in order to 
protect an organization's information assets. Hone and Eloff (2002) suggest the 
information security policy should be short and easy to read. 
Exceptional situations are defined as atypical circumstances that may arise in an 
emergent organization and cause employees to take actions that conflict with an 
information security policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
One of the primary goals of an information security policy is to provide guidance 
to employees in an organization by decreasing its risk, safeguarding its critical 
information assets and lowering its expenditures for information security management 
(Shoraka, 2011). In addition to complying with all internal and external regulations and 
protocols, the policy should help to advance the structure and functionality of an 
organization’s information system (Nigam & Siponen, 2011). 
When stripped to its basic framework, an information security policy consists of 
the rules and procedures that employees are requested to follow in order to protect the 
private information of an organization and its clients. This framework is lent substance by 
comprehensiveness, clarity, a degree of autonomy, and adaptability to various situations. 
Ideally, the policy’s construction is completed by an awareness of how human behavior 
can affect the manner in which that underlying structure is supported and vice versa. As 
argued by Dunkerley and Tejay (2009), it is critical to apprehend the behaviors of the 
people who utilize the information assets of an organization in order to create a 
successful information security policy. Conversely, a poorly designed document provides 
limited usability and voluntariness and may negatively affect the employees’ willingness 
to comply with it. Consequently, the information security policy itself may pose an inside 
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threat to an organization if it is not well-designed because employees are more apt to 
misconstrue it or bypass its requirements, resulting in a state of noncompliance, which 
may subject confidential information to a breach of security (Sipior & Ward, 2008).  
As concluded by many recent studies, the human element was the cause of many 
information security breaches (Herath & Rao, 2009; Lineberry, 2007; West, Mayhorn, 
Hardee, & Mendel, 2009). Therefore, information security professionals must realize that 
the success of an information security policy relies upon an understanding of the 
multifaceted nature of human beings as much as it does upon technological expertise 
(Soo Hoo, 2000). In addition, practitioners must identify how an employee’s motives and 
level of freedom in making decisions about obeying or disregarding an information 
security policy are influenced by the circumstances surrounding an exceptional situation 
(Siponen & Iivari, 2006). 
Although the use of an information security policy is widely advocated for 
protecting confidential data, few experimental studies investigated how the structure, 
phrasing and execution of a policy affect an organization (Verendel, 2009). Despite this 
lack of empirical research, indications strongly suggest that a versatile, functional and 
straightforward information security policy most effectively safeguards the confidential 
data of an organization (Bahtiyar, & Ufuk, 2012; Sun, Han, & Liu, 2008). Any type of 
breach or violation in an information security policy can be very costly and detrimental to 
an organization. Therefore, it is vital for any organization to invest its time and resources 
into designing an information security policy that diminishes this potential risk factor.  
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2.2 Challenges faced by organizations 
 
 
In a study conducted by Cisco (2008), over 50 percent of employees 
acknowledged that they had knowingly violated the terms of their organization's 
information security policy and an average of nearly half of the employees at the various 
companies taking part in the study said that the reason they chose to violate the policy 
was based on the assumption that the risks associated with their transgressions were 
negligible. However, many organizations reported that employee abuse of information 
security policies resulted in negative consequences that cost them a significant amount of 
time and money to repair and led to the eradication or misappropriation of confidential 
data (Cisco). 
Although a considerable number of studies focused on the issue of employee 
noncompliance, many organizations still face distinct challenges when developing an 
information security policy. According to Long (2002), some of these challenges include 
the level of satisfactory risk acceptance; variations in procedures among different 
departments as a result of the unique threats faced by each; the legal constraints placed on 
various business units according to their geographical location; personal viewpoints; and 
the values, philosophies and politics of different cultures. When the risk-management 
department of an organization implements an information security policy that covers all 
of the organization’s branches and divisions (Soo Hoo, 2000; Spears, 2006; Wang, 
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Chaudhury, & Rao, 2008), it can decrease the possibility of jeopardizing the 
organization’s information assets by positively influencing the actions of employees 
(Hadasch et al., 2011).  
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) concluded that when an organization is 
experiencing rapid internal changes in its structure, it may enforce stringent safety 
measures that can restrict an employee’s ability to retrieve or view sensitive data, 
essentially acting as an impediment that can pose a serious threat to the successful 
continuation of an organization. This dilemma impedes an organization’s ability to grow 
and pressures organizations to produce information security policies that are 
contradictory and stringent. Oftentimes, the organizational changes made by a company 
are due to profitable business ventures that were unanticipated, possibly causing an 
organization to temporarily enforce procedures that are in opposition to the terms of its 
information security policy. 
One of the most consequential problems faced by organizations, however, is that 
the view of reality held by the majority of people opposes some of the practices defined 
by an information security policy (Bosworth & Kabay, 2002). An employee might allow 
a colleague without the same level of credentials to view confidential documents simply 
because the two of them are working together on an assignment or might share a 
password based only on the fact that a co-worker is someone he or she trusts or likes. 
However, most information security policies are still effective to some degree in 
discouraging employee noncompliance (Straub & Nance, 1990), making them a 
necessary component of an organization's information security management system. 
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According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), organizations that deal with variable 
conditions on a regular basis are in particular need of employing an information security 
policy that is developed according to application principles. The use of application 
principles are effective in helping an organization to develop an information security 
policy that defines not only the actions and behaviors that employees are mandated or 
forbidden to perform during times of stability but also those that are considered 
reasonable and unreasonable in exceptional situations. In addition, they grant employees 
a measure of autonomy to use their own judgment in making a decision. 
     An information security policy needs to provide employees with a precise 
awareness of its objectives. It should also include well-defined explanations, examples 
and descriptions, in addition to specific details of an employee’s expectations and 
obligations (Gaunt, 1998). An information security policy that is designed appropriately 
encourages and inspires an employee to contribute to an organization’s aim of 
maintaining the security of its confidential information. 
 
2.3 Information security policy approaches 
 
 
Many researchers have published studies on different approaches to implementing 
an information security policy, including checklists and industry standards (BSI, 2012; 
GASSP, 1999), a virtual methodology (Hitchings, 1995) and a security-planning system 
(Straub & Welke, 1998). However, these studies largely failed to offer organizations any 
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pragmatic assistance on how to design the information security policy (Baskerville & 
Siponen, 2002). 
Hone and Eloff (2002) agreed that an information security policy plays a role of 
central importance in any organization’s information security division. Because an 
information security policy is oftentimes difficult to prepare and design, organizations 
may obtain ready-made policies or templates from a variety of sources, such as textbooks 
and the Internet. However, these policies are usually not industry-specific and may 
require modification in order to meet the needs of a particular organization. Baskerville 
and Siponen (2002) asserted that ready-made policies offer organizations little guidance 
with preparing a policy, which is a matter of greater importance than simply providing 
employees with a catalog of acceptable or unacceptable actions. Although some 
organizations have consultants or IS specialists to make these revisions, Bjorck (2004) 
stated that this does not necessarily solve the problem of properly implementing the 
information security policy, which employees and management may ignore, even if they 
are making an important business decision regarding information security. In addition, 
Von Solms (1999) asserted that some organizations may not proffer the funds to 
effectively employ an information security policy unless management believes that the 
value is worth the cost. 
Recent ISO/IEC directives (2011) defined a normative element of an information 
security policy as one that states the boundaries of the policy or specifies its conditions. 
More specifically, these ISO/EIC procedures postulate terms and acceptable equivalents 
that an organization is required to use when denoting normative elements in an 
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information security policy that are not mandatory in exceptional cases. The terms 
indicated in Part 2 of the ISO/IEC Directives, which include “may,” “need not” and “can,” 
are intended to give employees a degree of independence and direction when making 
choices on the actions to take in exceptional situations. 
However, the effectiveness of these procedures is criticized for a number of 
reasons. Some of these reasons are that the procedures are too broad and hypothetical for 
a particular organization or marketplace, require managers to dedicate ample time to 
scrutinizing and enhancing their effectiveness, and do not place emphasis on increasing 
customer satisfaction. In addition, it is argued that ISO 9001 focuses more on the 
regulations and guidelines of an information security policy than on providing employees 
with insight on how to interpret those procedures (Seddon, 2000). Both ISO 9000 and 
9001 are criticized for presenting organizations with a registration process that is both 
laborious and costly (Clifford, 2005). Consequently, the need to design an information 
security policy that takes into account an employee’s motivations and provides guidance 
for an employee on how to construe the terms of the policy, particularly in exceptional 
situations, remains a relevant issue for organizations. 
Many current researchers also advocate executing information security policies 
that prohibit improper use of IS data, equipment and processes in order to decrease the 
risks presented by employees (Hadasch et al., 2011). These studies helped to clarify some 
of the factors that can influence employee compliance with  an information security 
policy, including an understanding of the risks of noncompliance with protective 
technologies (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009;  Liang & Xue, 2010), the real or 
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perceived intrinsic and extrinsic benefits and motivations of compliance versus 
noncompliance, such as self-efficacy, ease of use, organizational support, deterrents and 
social stimuli (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Liang & Xue; Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen & 
Vance, 2010) and the reluctance to make inappropriate use of an organization’s 
information security assets (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2008; Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010). However, these studies largely failed to provide information security specialists 
with specific advice on how to design an information security policy, especially one that 
was effective in helping employees to resolve exceptional situations (Siponen & Iivari, 
2006). 
 
2.4 Information Security Standards, Policies, and Guidelines 
 
According to Vroom and von Solms (2004), not all employees’ violations of 
information security policies are carried out with intentional or malicious intents. The 
violations can be the result of negligence, a lack of understanding, clarity or 
comprehensiveness, or ignorance of the security policies of the organization. Some 
standards exist to address such violations and to specify how they can be avoided in 
organizations. 
In order to help universalize technology-based regulations, some organizations 
regularly publish updated standards and guidelines in order to help universalize the 
methods of maintaining and promoting information security management systems 
(ISMS), in addition to other technologies. The SANS Institute (Smith, 2004) and the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ISO/IEC 27000 recommended the 
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application of an information security policy that is adaptable and allows for exceptions 
to the rules based on unique circumstances. 
Although interest in IS security has increased in recent years, very few empirical 
studies examined how designing information security policies for exceptional situations 
can benefit organizations. ISO 27000 suggests that an organization needs to continually 
update and revise its information security policy to ensure that it remains clear, 
comprehensive, easy to use and appropriate to the organization’s specific business 
objectives and strategic goals. Again, this information failed to provide organization with 
assistance on how to develop and implement an information security policy that 
incorporates these elements and is easily understood by employees, especially regarding 
exceptional situations. 
Existing literature agrees that employees who have malicious intent or who do not 
comply with an information security policy under normal conditions are the main threat 
to an organization’s information assets. However, there are also many instances in which 
an employee violates an information security policy in the belief that his or her decision 
to do so is more advantageous to the organization than complying with the policy 
(Siponen & Iivari, 2006; Siponen & Vance, 2010). In today’s swiftly advancing 
technological environment, it is not uncommon for clients to request last-minute changes 
or modifications to a product or service they are obtaining from an organization. With 
little time to prepare for these adjustments, employees may need to temporarily violate 
information security policies in order to accommodate a client’s needs. Therefore, it is 
critical for organizations to analyze the reasons and justifications that motivate 
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employees to obey or ignore information security policies in exceptional situations and 
the effect of the employees’ actions on all parties involved in the business transaction. 
 
2.5 Developing and implementing an information security policy 
 
An information security policy safeguards the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of an organization’s paper and electronic documents and the privacy of 
clients, personnel and the company in its entirety from various threats and hazards (Da 
Veiga, Martins, & Eloff, 2007). Consequently, information security policies are usually 
designed as "living documents." A living document is one that is revised and expanded 
over time. This type of document is particularly suited for an information security policy 
because of the rapid technological, procedural and business changes that are made in 
today’s world (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004). 
Initially, surveys based on ad hoc theories or empirical analyses were the primary 
methods of gathering data from an organization’s workforce by IS researchers evaluating 
the issue of employee compliance with an information security policy (Hu, Xu, Dinev, & 
Ling, 2011). As of late, however, IS researchers are recognizing the growing importance 
of examining this concern through the lens of more established theories (D’Arcy et al., 
2008; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Siponen, 2000). 
As previously stated, an organization may face the challenging issue of human 
involvement when developing and implementing an information security policy. The 
success of many of the procedures in an information security policy often relies upon the 
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compliance of an organization’s employees. Analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness 
of such procedures is possible only if the actions taken by humans are assessable and 
subject to persuasion and if the organization encourages compliance by rewarding 
positive behaviors and penalizing negative behaviors (Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 
2010). 
According to Liang and Xue (2010), it is critical to understand the impact that an 
individual working in a socio-technical environment can have on the security of an 
information system. The socio-technical theory recognizes two distinct yet interrelated 
subsystems that operate in most organizations: a technical subsystem made up of 
equipment, techniques and processes and a social system made up of employees and their 
skills, expertise, viewpoints and principles (Bostrom et al., 2009). Recent IS security 
studies are placing increased focus on how individual employees can negatively or 
positively impact the security of an organization’s information assets in a socio-technical 
work setting (Liang & Xue). 
The design theories proposed by Siponen and Iivari (2006) offer an effective 
solution to this problem because their application principles are intended to account for 
the factor of human involvement. In addition, Siponen and Iivari offered pragmatic 
advice to researchers and scholars on how to gather empirical evidence to design a policy 
that can aid employees with taking the appropriate actions in exceptional situations, 
including those cases that present a conflict between achieving an organization’s business 
objectives and strictly complying with the information security policy. When integrated 
into an information security policy, these design theories promote employee compliance 
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by informing employees of the circumstances, justifications and causes that are 
acceptable or unacceptable in regard to violating the policy’s terms without fear of 
punishment or reprisal. 
Depending on an employee’s intrinsic motivations, achieving the goal of the 
application principle itself may prove rewarding. According to Beswick (2002), some 
individuals feel a sense of gratification or fulfillment if their actions or accomplishments 
endorse their sense of self-worth or support their ethical or moral beliefs. An employee 
may feel satisfaction if his or her violation of an information security policy based on the 
utilitarian design theory brings happiness to the greatest amount of people in an 
exceptional situation. In addition, information security policies that utilize the prima-facie, 
utilitarian and universalizability design theories can be tested empirically to evaluate their 
effectiveness (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Therefore, these design theories are a practical 
alternative for organizations seeking to devise an effective information security policy. 
According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), the two fundamental features that should 
be incorporated into an information security policy during its design process are 
adaptability and ease of use, in regard to both terminology and application. These 
elements help to increase the likelihood of employee compliance. 
 Although Siponen and Iivari (2006) do not address the process of meta-design, 
their theoretical models for the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability design 
theories contain all the standard elements of a meta-policy. According to Baskerville and 
Siponen (2002), a meta-policy focuses on the development of an information security 
policy as well as its flexibility, application and validity. In addition, it is created to 
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expedite revisions to procedures in an information security policy that contradict the 
business objectives of an organization as it continues to grow and evolve (Baskerville & 
Siponen). Baskerville and Siponen argue that information security policies based on 
traditional checklists and universal standards, such as those issued by the ISO, are less 
effective than meta-policies because they are too generalized to apply to the distinctive 
culture of individual organizations. 
Information security policies that contain standard normative procedures cannot 
adequately stipulate actions or processes to resolve every conceivable circumstance that 
may arise in an exceptional situation (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). However, Siponen and 
Iivari argued that employees can effectively resolve a broad spectrum of exceptional 
situations if an information security policy is designed with the following three elements: 
a kernel theory basis; application principles from that kernel theory specifying how 
employees should manage exceptional situations; and hypotheses that can be tested. As 
defined by Siponen and Iivari, testable hypotheses denote an organization’s intention to 
develop a research agenda to assist in advancing the continued analysis of information 
security policies.   
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The research methodology was based on the framework proposed by Hevner, 
March, Park and Ram (2004), which emphasized the design-science aspect of IS research 
while recognizing that this approach is inextricably linked to the behavioral-science 
paradigm. The researcher followed the design science approach (Hevner et al.) to answer 
the following research question: "Does adopting the prima-facie, utilitarian, and 
universalizability normative theories help organizations to design an effective 
information security policy in exceptional situations?”. The goal of design science is to 
offer innovative and applicable organizational solutions in the form of design artifacts to 
help resolve a problem domain's challenges and obstacles (Hevner et al.). As stated by 
Hevner et al, design science in the realm of information technology (IT) is ultimately 
intended to solve issues related to the development, application and execution of 
information systems by creating a unique and effective artifact that provides an 
organization with practical benefits. 
An artifact is described as an instantiation, model, construct or method that is 
used to produce or employ one or more components of an information system other than 
those involving the constituents that make up a particular organization, including its 
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culture, employees, structure and commercial practices (Hevner et al., 2004). Although 
the paradigm of design science is an indispensable factor in the formation of an IT 
artifact, these distinctive characteristics of an organization still play an integral role in the 
crafting and executing of an operative information system (Hevner et al., 2004).  
The artifact of this study was an information security policy. A method to design 
and implement an information security policy that it is effective in resolving exceptional 
situations in an organization was developed and evaluated to achieve this goal. According 
to Hevner et al. (2004), the success of a design science research project involving an IT 
artifact relies upon a thorough evaluation of the artifact's value, effectiveness, 
comprehensiveness and dependability in the context of the specific organization that it is 
designed to benefit. Hence, the utility and efficacy of IS design theories are established 
by evaluating their outputs: design artifacts.   
Researchers must assess a design artifact to establish its usefulness, effectiveness 
and merit. The goal of the design artifact evaluation is to show that the proposed artifact 
provides value to the problem domain. If the artifact evaluation reveals that a design 
artifact meets the problem domain's requisites and restrictions, the researcher is able to 
confirm that the design theory is complete and effective. This study used an experimental 
method to evaluate the efficacy of an information security policy based on the prima-
facie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories in resolving exceptional situations 
in an organization. 
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3.2 Theoretical Basis 
 
The theoretical basis for the study followed Siponen and Iivari’s (2006) prima-
facie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories to achieve the goal of designing 
and implementing an information security policy that helps employees to effectively 
resolve exceptional situations in an organization. These are normative theories that 
account for the factor of human involvement by providing employees with guidance on 
the appropriate actions to take in exceptional situations, particularly those cases that 
present a conflict between achieving an organization’s business objectives and strictly 
complying with the information security policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  
The prima-facie theory, developed by Ross (2003), purports that a person's 
actions are acceptable if the good that results from taking those actions is greater than the 
good that results from not taking them. From an IS security perspective, this means that if 
an employee violates the terms of an information security policy in an exceptional 
situation, those actions are acceptable as long as they prove more beneficial to an 
organization than if the employee had adhered to the terms of the policy.  
The utilitarianism and other normative theories form the most suitable basis for 
the development and application of information security policies that account for the 
possibility of exceptional situations and the actions that people should take when 
adhering to the standard would have deleterious effects (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  
Conceived by Kant (2002) in 1785, the moral philosophy of universalizability 
states that an action or behavior is morally just if the maxim on which it is based could be 
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universally accepted. Although based on this premise, Siponen and Iivari’s (2006) 
universalizability design theory recognized varying degrees of universality. Their theory 
consists of two sub-theses—impartial and security partial—that act as the application 
principles for an information security policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). The impartial 
universalizability thesis stipulates that an employee is permitted to take an action if any 
other worker in the organization is granted that privilege under comparable circumstances, 
and the security partial universalizability thesis requires an employee to contemplate if 
the organization’s president or information security manager would permit any 
responsible employee to take the action in question (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Based on 
these theories, this study intended to confirm that an information security policy can 
effectively resolve information security conflicts that arise in exceptional situations if the 
policy affords employees the possibility of taking actions that violate its terms on the 
condition that these actions are more universally acceptable than taking actions that 
comply with its terms. 
As argued by Siponen and Iivari (2006), philosophical normative theories can 
provide organizations with some understanding of the conditions and motives that cause 
employees to violate normative information security policies in exceptional 
circumstances and aid practitioners in the design and implementation of an information 
security policy that helps employees to effectively resolve contingencies in the workplace. 
According to Warman (1992), normative standards of an information security policy 
specify how employees should or should not handle certain situations involving the CIA 
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of an organization’s information assets. In contrast, non-normative standards are 
informational or explanatory in nature (Krupansky, 2005).  
However, Siponen and Iivari (2006) pointed out that empirical research needs to 
be conducted in order to determine (a) if employees choose to violate or to observe an 
information security policy in exceptional situations; (b) how employees justify their 
decisions based on the application principles of the design theories; (c) the degree of 
influence those motivating factors have on the actions taken by employees. The results of 
these findings will contribute to the body of extant knowledge that endeavors to remedy 
the challenge of human involvement in the crafting and administering of an information 
security policy, particularly in organizations where exceptional situations regularly 
generate conflicts with an organization’s business goals and objectives. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
 
The following hypotheses were adapted from Siponen and Iivari’s (2006) testable 
design product hypotheses for designing application principles to cover exceptional 
situations in an organization’s information security policy based on the prima-facie, 
utilitarian or universalizability design theory. The hypotheses for this study focused 
primarily on turbulent organizations with a rapidly changing business environment 
(Siponen & Iivari, 2006). According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), these organizations 
were much more likely to encounter exceptional situations that may require an employee 
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to violate the terms of an information security policy in order to support the 
organization’s best interests. 
Moore and Benbasat (1991) argued that an individual’s perceived qualities of an 
information technology (IT) innovation (method, process, procedure, etc.) are a more 
reliable indicator of his or her subsequent behaviors than the actual characteristics of that 
innovation. Therefore, voluntariness refers to an employee’s perception of his or her 
freedom of choice in complying with or violating an information security policy's terms. 
The voluntarism is a common construct in all three normative theories and included in all 
hypotheses to show the impact of voluntariness on the acceptance of policy. 
Effectiveness indicates the success of an information security policy in persuading an 
employee to take the actions that provide the greatest intrinsic and extrinsic benefits to an 
organization, its employees and clients, and the individual performing the actions. 
Net benefits denote the business advantages gained by an organization, not 
including any egocentric gains to the individual performing the actions. Net benefits are 
the application principle in the prima-facie design theory by Siponen and Iivari (2006), 
which was based on the prima-facie ethical theory of Ross (2003). Based on the premises 
of this theory, it is expected that the research experiment validated that an information 
security policy can effectively resolve information security conflicts that arise in 
exceptional situations if the policy grants employees the liberty of compromising its 
guidelines when the benefits of doing so are greater than the benefits of compliance.  
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The prima-facie design theory allows for violations of the terms of an information 
security policy in exceptional situations if the benefits expected to be gained by 
noncompliance outweigh those expected to be gained by compliance. 
 
• H1: If the employees’ voluntarism and the expected benefits of 
noncompliance increase, then an organization will experience fewer 
consequences in response to employee noncompliance in exceptional 
situations. 
    
The philosophy of utilitarianism developed by Bentham (1907) is based on the 
moral foundation of behaving in a manner that provides the most utility, or happiness, 
and the least amount of pain to the greatest number of individuals. Siponen and Iivari 
(2006) adapted this philosophical theory to their utilitarian design theory, which promotes 
taking the actions that spread happiness to the greatest number of individuals involved in 
a business transaction. This approach provides employees with some latitude in taking 
actions that violate an information security policy if the anticipated effects of the actions 
are more advantageous to the organization than the anticipated effects of the actions 
produced by complying with the policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Consequently, it is 
expected that the quasi-experimental study revealed that an information security policy 
can effectively resolve information security conflicts that arise in exceptional situations if 
the policy gives employees the option of contradicting its terms in order to adhere to 
security objectives that profit the greatest number of individuals involved in a business 
transaction. 
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• H2: If the employees' voluntarism and happiness of noncompliance 
increase, then an organization will experience fewer consequences in 
response to employee noncompliance in exceptional situations. 
The utilitarian design theory states that employees should obey the terms of an 
information security policy under standard conditions but that the terms may be violated 
if the number of people who profit from overall adherence to security objectives by this 
action is greater than the number of people who do not profit.       
 
The universalizability design theory states that employees should obey an 
information security policy in ordinary situations. In exceptional situations, however, 
they may follow one of the theory's two sub-theses.  
• H3: If the employees' voluntarism and universalizability of noncompliance 
increase, then an organization will experience fewer consequences in 
response to employee noncompliance in exceptional situations. 
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Figure 1. Research model. 
 
     Adapted from Siponen and Iivari’s (2006) "Six Design Theories for IS Security," 
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics that account for an information security policy that is 
successful in exceptional situations. According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), the 
"success" of a policy is defined in terms of the positive information-security 
consequences (dependent variable) that result from an employee's actions in exceptional 
situations based on the independent variables.  The minus sign following a hypothesis 
indicates if this theorized association is expected to minimize the dependent variable.  
The plus signs following the independent variables in Figure 1 indicate if those variables 
have an interactive relationship with the dependent variable. For example, H1 illustrates 
that as the voluntariness and expected benefits of an action increase, there is a 
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corresponding rise in the probability that an organization will experience positive 
consequences in response to employee actions in exceptional situations.   
The dependent variable in this study was the consequences of an employee's 
actions on the information security of an organization, and the independent variables 
were the unique application principles of the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability 
design methods, along with the degree of voluntariness an information security policy 
allowed an employee. The application principle (or kernel theory) for the prima-facie 
design theory aims to achieve the greatest net benefits for an organization. Likewise, the 
intentions of the application principles for the utilitarian and universalizability design 
theories strive to achieve the greatest degree of adherence to security objectives and 
universalizability, respectively. Although Siponen and Iivari (2006) investigated the 
potential effects of other design theories on the success or failure of an information 
security policy, this study focused on the three design theories mentioned above because 
of their flexibility and their recognition of and allowance for the fact that disobeying the 
terms of an information security policy sometimes resulted in a more positive outcome 
for an organization than the consequences of complying with the terms of a policy. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
 
This research study followed the design science research approach in IS. The 
purpose of design science is to contribute to the knowledge base for the design and 
construction of artifacts and to enhance the understanding of how to solve the social and 
organizational problem for which the artifact is designed. According to Walls, Widmeyer 
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and Sawy (1992), while the natural sciences are geared to find answers to questions about 
the way things actually are, design sciences seek to answer questions about how things 
should be. When design sciences are applied to the field of IS, the development of 
artifacts is used to reach established goals (Simon, 1996). 
Design science research is defined by Hevner et al. (2004) as follows:  
"Design science research is a research paradigm in which a designer 
answers questions relevant to human problems via the creation of innovative 
artifacts, thereby contributing new knowledge to the body of scientific evidence. 
The designed artifacts are both useful and fundamental in understanding that 
problem. The fundamental principle of design science research is that knowledge 
and understanding of a design problem and its solution are acquired in the 
building and application of an artifact." 
 
Design science is research that is intended to add to the body of knowledge in the 
academic field and to provide guidance to practitioners through the creation of 
information system artifacts using precise and meticulous methods (Hevner et al., 2004). 
When used as a tool to develop a product, design science can be thought of as “a plan of 
something to be done or produced” (March & Smith, 1995). In this regard, design science 
is a research method that relies on the establishment of unique artifacts to solve problems 
(Hevner et al.; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008), contribute to human knowledge and 
awareness, and endow organizations with an increased ability to manage resources, 
including their employee base. Through the development and utilization of the artifact 
with the appropriate tools and techniques, the design-science research output solution is 
achieved (March & Smith). One of the primary goals of a design-science artifact is to 
augment and expand the knowledge base related to the resolution of complicated and 
challenging business problems (Hevner et al., 2004).  
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As observed by Hevner et al. (2004), the design artifact and IS design theory are 
alike in many ways. Meta-design is a framework that satisfies meta-requirements through 
the application of specific elements defined by a particular group of artifacts and 
guidelines (Markus, Majchrzak, & Gasser, 2002). The conceptual foundations of meta-
designs and meta-requirements are cultivated from the alteration, expansion or 
application of kernel theories (Hevner et al., 2004). According to Markus et al., the 
method used to design an artifact is, in essence, the set of standards that ultimately leads 
to the formation of the artifact. 
Design science research leads to a normative IS philosophy that benefits both 
scholars and practitioners (Markus et al., 2002). Hevner et al. (2004) asserted that rigor 
and relevance are essential elements of the results of any IS research, which is intended to 
supplement the body of existing knowledge and to prove effective when put into practice 
in the workplace. A key purpose of design science research, as a problem-solving concept 
(Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995; Simon, 1996; Walls et al., 1992), is to assist 
organizations in achieving their business objectives. In order to achieve this goal, those 
who conduct design science research must acquire a thorough understanding of the theory 
and be able to formulate a precise description of the business problem they are striving to 
resolve.  
According to Hevner et al. (2004), the assessment process that is chosen relies 
upon the consideration of the accessibility of needed materials and the careful evaluation 
of the characteristics of the problem and the artifact design. Hevner et al. (2004) also 
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suggested that it is advantageous to make use of existing assessment methods to assist in 
calculating the efficacy and rigorousness of potential IT artifacts.  
Hevner et al. (2004) proposed that IS research falls into one of two categories: the 
behavioral paradigm or the design science paradigm. The former seeks to determine the 
truth and the latter seeks to create a utilizable artifact (Hevner et al., 2004). Hevner et al. 
(2004) also stated that the development of effective IS design theories and artifacts is 
improved by taking into account the needs of the business world and combining them 
with data drawn from the existing academic base to successfully satisfy the dual 
requirements of rigor and relevance that are essential to achieving the goal of 
constructing an effective design theory and IS artifact.  
The results of this type of research are both relevant and rigorous because they are 
designed to solve a distinctive business problem and are generally reached by attempting 
to prove a design theory that can contribute to the academic knowledge base (Hevner et 
al., 2004). The seven guidelines suggested by Hevner et al. (2004) for research involving 
design science are summarized in Table 1 below and described in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
The first design-science guideline proposed by Hevner et al. (2004) is that it is 
essential for an artifact to be devised as a model, construct, method or instantiation. 
According to Hevner et al. (2004), the foundation of IS research is the IS artifact, which 
incorporates into its design the features that are the essence of all phases of IS 
development, from examination to fabrication to implementation. The central focus of IS 
research is the problem relevance, which refers to the interest and significance the 
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problem has to the business world. By rigorously evaluating a design, researchers can 
improve and advance the process of developing an artifact by identifying and correcting 
any flaws or weaknesses.  
This research study applied the seven design-science research guidelines 
introduced by Hevner et al. (2004) to all aspects of the design-science research process in 
order to foster results that meet the objectives of rigor and relevancy. The seven design-
science research guidelines, as defined by Hevner et al. (2004), are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Design-science research guidelines (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83) 
 
Guideline Description 
1. Design as an Artifact Design-science research must produce a 
viable artifact in the form of a construct, a 
model, a method, or an instantiation. 
2. Problem Relevance  The objective of design-science research is 
to develop technology-based solutions to 
important and relevant business problems. 
3. Design Evaluation The utility, quality, and efficacy of a 
design artifact must be rigorously 
demonstrated via well-executed evaluation 
methods. 
4. Research Contributions Effective design-science research must 
provide clear and verifiable contributions 
in the areas of the design artifact, design 
foundations, and/or design methodologies. 
5. Research Rigor Design-science research relies upon the 
application of rigorous methods in both 
the construction and evaluation of the 
design artifact. 
6. Design as a Search The search for an effective artifact 
requires utilizing available Process means 
to reach desired ends while satisfying laws 
in the problem environment. 
7. Communication of Research Design-science research must be presented 
effectively both to technology-oriented as 
well as management-oriented audiences. 
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The guidelines applied to this research study are discussed in the order they are 
presented in Table 1. 
Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact. Design-science research must produce a viable 
artifact in the form of a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation (Hevner et al., 
2004, p. 83). 
The design artifact of this research study is to develop an information security 
policy effective in exceptional situations.  
Guideline 2: Problem Relevance. The objective of design-science research is to 
develop technology-based solutions to important and relevant business problems (Hevner 
et al., 2004, p. 83). 
Siponen and Iivari (2006) stated that there is a lack of information about how to 
design information security policies intended to handle exceptional situations in an 
organization. One purpose of this research study was to address this deficiency of 
knowledge.   
Guideline 3: Design Evaluation. The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design 
artifact must be rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods (Hevner 
et al., 2004, p. 83). 
The evaluation of the design artifact was demonstrated and illustrations for 
applying the assessment methods in practice were presented in this research study. 
Guideline 4: Research Contributions. Effective design-science research must 
provide clear and verifiable contributions in the areas of the design artifact, design 
foundations, and/or design methodologies (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83). 
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The contributions of this research study were the final results of the design of 
information security policies for the Information Systems domain. 
Guideline 5: Research Rigor. Design-science research relies upon the application 
of rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the design artifact (Hevner 
et al., 2004, p. 83). 
This study used design theories to develop and test different information security 
policies and to evaluate the policies through experiments.   
Guideline 6: Design as a Search. The search for an effective artifact requires 
utilizing available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem 
environment (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83). 
The design-science research was based on literature reviews of information 
security policy implementation and design in the IS domain. 
Guideline 7: Communication of Research. Design-science research must be 
presented effectively to technology-oriented and management-oriented audiences 
(Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83). 
This research study was intended for technology-oriented practitioners and 
academicians who are researching issues related to designing an effective information 
security policy. It also provided additional knowledge to managerial-oriented personnel 
seeking to evaluate, implement and design an effective information security policy in the 
information security field. 
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In summary, the Hevner et al. (2004) guidelines provided the following 
characteristics: 
1. Rigorous development of an artifact that meets business needs 
2. Implementation of quality standards 
3. Contributions toward the body of knowledge 
4. Suitable evaluation; ability to form the core of design science research 
In addition, the research process of this research study used the general design 
research cycle explained by Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2008) and illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The general methodology of design research Kuechler and Vaishnavi 
(2008). 
 
The design science research methodology proposed by Kuechler and Vaishnavi 
(2008) comprises five phases: (a) awareness of a problem, (b) suggestions, (c) 
development, (d) evaluation, and (e) conclusion. The following section explains how 
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these phases correlate with the design science framework and how the phases were used 
in this research study.  The research study started with Phase 1 and Phase 2, which 
formulated a problem based on literature review. Phase 3 developed the artifact and the 
design concept model, and Phase 4 was the performance of a quasi-experiment for 
evaluation. Finally, Phase 5 consisted of completion of the data analysis results. 
 
3.5 Phases 1 and 2 – Awareness of Problem and Suggestion 
 
Siponen and Iivari (2006) indicated that there is a need to develop information 
security policies designed to deal with exceptional situations in organizations. Following 
the second guideline as stated by Hevner et al. (2004), Phases 1 and 2 of this study 
formulated a problem taken from literature review and examined and showed the 
importance and relevance of designing an information security policy in the IS domain, 
based on the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories. The design 
process of an information security policy in these phases was based on these three 
theories and was discussed and reviewed with a team of five information security 
practitioners in the organization. A lack of design information for security policies in the 
field of IS domain was addressed in this research study (D’Aubeterre, Iyer, & Singh, 
2009; Kolkowska & Dhillon, 2012).  The literature is lacking in empirical studies that 
closely examine how to design clear, flexible and comprehensive information security 
policies so employees can make positive decisions when faced with exceptional 
situations (Whitman, 2008). Designing an effective information security policy for 
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exceptional situations in an organization is valuable for at least three potential reasons. 
An information security policy needs to provide clarity and communicate potential risk to 
employees of an organization in exceptional situations, in addition to ensuring that risk 
mitigation methods are in place. The policy also needs to increase flexibility for 
employees when making decisions about "mandatory" rules and reporting identified 
violations in exceptional situations. Lastly, the design effectiveness of an information 
security policy can be increased if the policy is comprehensive and it is integrated with 
other business policies in the organization, making it a part of the organization's culture 
(Puhakaiken & Siponen, 2010). The end product of these phases was a proposal for new 
research and the results are an effective design of an information security policy in 
exceptional situations. 
 
3.6 Phase 3 – Artifact Development 
 
 
This research study focused on the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability 
design theories in order to develop an information security policy artifact. During this 
phase, the artifact was developed based on literature review and the three aforementioned 
normative theories utilizing design application principles. The literature review, 
organizational strategies and processes, business needs, and the roles and behaviors of 
people were used to create an information security policy. An information security policy 
prototype was developed and implemented. Prototyping development was borrowed from 
the software engineering discipline, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Prototyping (based on Sommerville 2007, p. 411) 
 
After the development of the information security policy prototype, the overall 
concept was evaluated (Sommerville, 2007). The evaluation process was intended to 
determine if the design artifact meets the conditions of the problem domain, ensuring that 
it is functional and efficient. Design artifacts should be assessed according to five specific 
criteria: observational, analytical, experimental, testing, and descriptive (D’Aubeterre et 
al., 2009). An experiment based on empirical evidence is of assistance in validating the 
characteristics of the intended design artifact (Hevner et al., 2004) and producing broad-
spectrum results (Creswell, 2008). Experimental evaluations examine the nature and 
performance of design artifacts through the application of simulation and controlled 
experiments. Baskerville, Pries-Heje, and Venable (2007) proposed that an evaluation 
process conducted using experiments or other "hard methods" can help to reduce errors 
and ensure the procedure is all-inclusive.  
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Combining the paradigms of behavioral science and design science, Hevner et al. 
(2004) established an information systems research framework. Hevner et al. (2004) 
asserted that the integration of these two sciences enhances information systems research. 
As described in Figure 3, the information systems research framework defines 
information systems research through the construction and assessment of theories and 
artifacts. This study used a quantitative research method to prove hypotheses by 
exploring how different variables influence and impact each other. The information 
security policy design process can impact employee behavior regarding information 
security policies in exceptional situations. The variables used in this research focused on 
the information security policy design developed for an organization. These variables 
explored an employee's voluntariness to comply with the terms of an existing information 
security policy during exceptional situations. The dependent variable was information-
security consequences. The independent variables were as follows: (a) security expected 
benefits; (b) happiness brought about by security actions; (c) universalizability by 
security actions; and (e) voluntariness (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). The output of this phase 
was an information security policy artifact. Practitioners should assess a design artifact's 
value and efficiency to determine its benefits to an organization. According to Hevner et 
al. (2004), the knowledge base contains reliable approaches for the rigorous assessment 
of a design artifact. As suggested by Hevner et al. (2004), the primary factors guiding the 
evaluation process should be the basic characteristics of the problem and the artifact and 
resources accessible to the researcher.  
. 
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Figure 4. Design science research framework (Adapted from Hevner et al. 2004 p. 
80). 
 
The environment and the applicable knowledge base regulate research activity. 
The environment can be defined as the problem space where the relevant research criteria 
are found. The knowledge base can be defined as a combination of research methods and 
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information systems research foundations. At the hub of this framework is information 
systems research, where applicable research methods are selected from a knowledge base 
in an associated field and utilized according to an organization's requirements.  
The IT artifact is at the center of design science research and is based on both 
theory and practice to ensure an efficient system. It is possible for artifacts to generate 
innovative theories, so the future should be considered during the design process. Design 
scientists need to contemplate the research questions that will have to be answered when 
the artifact is being evaluated. This normative approach is frequently motivated by a 
conventional outlook of design and the idea of "wicked" problems; for example, the 
production of a functional artifact can be considered a contribution to science in itself if 
the design space in which it was developed posed considerable enough difficulties for the 
design scientist (Hevner et al., 2004).   
Artifacts are “intended to solve identified organizational problems. Such artifacts 
are represented in a structured form that may vary” (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 77). The 
artifact for this research project was how to design an information security policy that is 
effective in organizations in exceptional situations. The relevance of the problem is 
important because the research objective of the study was to address the lack of 
information about how to design information security policies intended to handle 
exceptional situations in an organization and to improve this deficiency of knowledge. 
The adopted research approach, therefore, followed the principle of “design theory 
hypothesizing the effectiveness of the artifact(s) to achieve the goal(s)” (Baskerville et al., 
2011, p. 124). 
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Experiments and surveys are some of the common tools used in the evaluation 
and validation process in research methodologies in the paradigm of behavioral science. 
Researchers in the information systems industry have long been analyzing and 
identifying theories by using these traditional methodologies. On the contrary, design 
science attempts to appraise the usefulness and value of the design artifact in the field of 
information systems research.  This assessment cannot be accurately made unless the 
effectiveness and quality of the system are well-defined. For instance, some of the 
characteristics that might describe the quality of the system are usability, practicality, 
comprehensiveness, stability, precision, dependability, and functionality (Hevner et al., 
2004). The aim of the assessment is to evaluate the effectiveness of the system and to 
offer objectives for gradual enhancements to the artifact over time. The degree to which 
information systems research meets the needs of organizations determines the degree of 
relevance while the proper utilization of methodologies and foundation principles 
establishes the bearing of relevance. Although other systems artifacts are also of 
significance in the development of IS policies, March and Smith (1995) and Hevner et al. 
(2004) argued that models, methods, and constructs are the most legitimate artifacts. 
Constructs describe the theoretical terminology of a domain.  Models express how 
constructs are associated. Methods explain how to complete an assignment. Theories are 
increasingly improved during the design-construction stage when concepts or 
methodologies of an experimental nature are utilized.  
The proposed end products of design science are generally twofold: (a) a 
serviceable artifact that helps to resolve an explicit and demanding problem in a 
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practicable manner within a particular framework, and; (b) significant contributions to 
information security practitioners. The information security policy was developed with 
input from subject- matter experts based on organizational strategies and processes and 
business needs utilizing a prototype approach.  Design science research involves a greater 
number of elements than social-science research, such as communication with subject-
matter experts (SMEs), an understanding of the environment and conditions surrounding 
the design, and construction and analysis of the system. A design science research 
approach relies more heavily on theories in the decision-making process than a standard 
systems research approach and on the capacity to gain broad assumptions from the 
important act of developing the system.  
 
3.7 Phase 4 – Evaluation 
 
Design artifacts evaluated empirically through the use of experimentation help to 
establish the artifact's characteristics (Hevner et al., 2004) and offer a foundation for 
general conclusions. Walls et al. (1992) recommended an experimental design in which 
the results of a group using an IT artifact are compared to the results of a group that is not 
using an IT artifact.  This study involved a pretest-posttest design that included a 
treatment group and a control group. The participants were not assigned to these groups 
by random assignment. Instead, a quasi-experiment, nonrandomized pretest-posttest 
design was conducted using an experimental group and a control group. The 
experimental group (Group A) underwent the treatment (X₁), while the control group 
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(Group B) received no treatment at all. The control group also served as the 
benchmarking point of comparison to evaluate the design effectiveness of an information 
security policy for exceptional situations in an organization (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; 
Creswell, 2008; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  
 
3.7.1 Sample population 
 
The population of this study was full-time and part-time employees who work in a 
single organization. There was a nonrandom sampling of participants and a nonrandom 
assignment of participants from the organization’s administrative employee directory into 
the two groups. Also, the group that received the treatment and the group that acted as the 
control group were randomly selected (Creswell, 2008). According to Walls et al. (1992), 
one practical design concept is to conduct an experiment in which the IT artifact is 
provided to an experimental group while being withheld from a control group. The results 
of each group can then be compared and contrasted (Walls et al., 1992).   
Thirty participants in the quasi-experiment for this research study were non-
randomly assigned into a control group and an experimental group with 15 participants in 
each group. According to Gay (1996), a minimum of 15 participants per group for quasi-
experimental studies is sufficient and valid. 
 The experimental group (Group A) was provided with an information security 
policy and hypothetical scenarios adapted from Siponen and Iivari (2006) and Siponen 
and Vance (2010) upon which to base their answers. The treatment group (Group A) was 
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given a pretest and posttest treatment to determine if violating the information security 
policy was attributable to policy design. The responses of the participants in the treatment 
group (Group A) were compared to those of the participants in the control group (Group 
B). Participants in Group B received an information security policy upon which to base 
their answers. The participants in Group A were presented with a hypothetical scenario 
describing an information security situation. They were asked to identify if the design 
elements in the scenario are related to following or violating the information security 
policy (treatment X). The participants in the control group (Group B) were presented with 
the information security policy design artifact conceptualization and evaluation method 
process, followed by questions that aimed at identifying the consequences of their actions 
on information security in exceptional situations. There was no treatment given to Group 
B. In summary, two observations were made for Group A and Group B, one prior to 
treatment X₁ (pretest, O₁ / pretest, O₃) and one after treatment (posttest, O₂ / posttest, O₄). 
Table 2. Two groups, A & B, pre-test, post-test. 
 
 
Group Pre-test Treatment Post-test 
Treatment group = A O₁ (X₁) O₂ 
Control group = B O₃  O₄ 
 
Treatment “X” represents the exposure of a group to an experimental variable or 
treatment, the effect of which was measured. Post-test “O” represents “an observation or 
measurement recorded on an instrument” (Creswell, 2008 p. 171). 
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The results of the data collection were analyzed to predict the outcome of the 
experiment in regard to how information security policy design elements can increase the 
effectiveness of an information security policy in exceptional situations. 
 
3.7.2 Study instrument 
 
A survey was developed and tested for reliability and validity and was used for 
the data collection. As a validated instrument, a survey is useful in establishing accurate 
associations between any variables used in the experiment (Creswell, 2008). A survey is 
a term that includes all techniques of data collections in which an individual is asked to 
respond to questions in a particular order. Surveys are useful instruments for collecting 
data while providing anonymity to the respondent, promoting responses that are more 
accurate and trustworthy (Creswell, 2008). 
The survey was divided into two parts. The first part focused on obtaining 
demographic information about the respondent and the organization. The following 
demographic information was collected:  gender, age, years of experience, years with the 
organization, educational level, and security certifications.  
 The second part was composed of questions designed to assess the various 
aspects of information security policy design. An expert panel with ten participants who 
had information security certification, such as CISM, CISSP and CISA (Hevner & 
Chatterjee, 2010), verified the validity of the survey instrument and established if the 
participants of the survey were likely to have trouble responding to any of its components 
(Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; Stewart, Shamdasan, & Rook, 2007). During instrument 
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survey development, questionnaire questions that may have appeared to be unclear, 
intrusive or confusing to the potential study participants were eliminated using a 
willingness-to-answer scale (Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford, 2006). An item-to-
construct scale was also used to help eliminate double-barreled questions and to address 
content validity (Hinkin, 1998). The researcher employed the procedure for developing a 
measurement instrument provided by Hinkin (1998). The instrument is illustrated in 
appendix B. A five-point Likert-type scale was used. Scalar questions enable a 
respondent to give an opinion as an answer. Numeric scales grant the ability to give a 
positive or negative response to a statement (Dawes, 2008). The scale's granularity may 
vary, in general. For example, a coarse scale may range from one to three while a fine 
scale may range from one to ten. According to DeVellis, 2011, scales ranging between 
one to five or seven are generally adequate to give respondents sufficient differentiation. 
Scales that are odd-numbered give respondents the option to remain “neutral,” while 
scales that are even-numbered are given to respondents if a “neutral” response will 
detract from the study's validity (Dillman, Smyth & Christian, 2009). Scalar questions 
frequently employ Likert scales (Dix, Finlay, Abowd & Beale, 2004; Preece, Rogers & 
Sharp, 2007).  The survey instrument was used to answer questions in regard to the 
clarity, comprehensiveness, flexibility and usability of the design of an information 
security policy, as illustrated in appendix B. 
 The hypothetical scenarios and questions were adopted from seminal papers of 
Siponen & Iivari, 2006 and Siponen & Vance, 2010 and were based on the hypotheses 
H1, H2 and H3 of the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories, 
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respectively. The survey used a Likert scale with a five-point range. According to Dawes, 
2008, the five-point Likert format is the most prevalent to ensure scale validity and 
reliability. The number 1 represented "strongly disagree," and the number 5 represented 
"strongly agree," granting every question a distinctive negative and positive descriptor. 
Table 3. Likert scale with a five-point range (reverse order descriptor). 
 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
For every question, the number 1 signified the negative descriptor with the lowest value, 
the number 5 signified the positive descriptor with the highest value, and the number 3 
signified a neutral value. If a respondent choose a low value, it signified that the 
individual felt a more powerful associative connection with the statement. If a respondent 
choose a high value, it signified that the individual felt a weak associative connection 
with the statement. Therefore, the stronger the respondent’s associative connection, the 
more negative the individual’s outlook, and the weaker the respondent’s associative 
connection, the more positive the individual’s outlook. The data were gathered using a 
questionnaire and were quantitative in nature, using the scale development theory 
proposed by DeVellis (2011). 
 
3.7.3 Data Analysis 
 
For the purposes of this research study, statistical regression analysis techniques 
were used to analyze the data to determine the dependability, validity and internal 
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stability of the instrument. Inferential statistics and factorial analysis strategies were 
employed, as suggested by Creswell (2008), which included an overall review of all 
information, data preparation, data reduction, organization and categorization. Inferential 
statistics used the general linear model (GLM) and included a repeated measure ANOVA 
(Nelder & Wedderburn, 1972). 
This study employed a posttest and pretest non-equivalent control group design of 
the quasi-experimental research design. An inferential statistics quasi-experimental 
research approach was used because the study was conducted in only one organization. A 
posttest and pretest non-equivalent control group of quasi-experimental design was used.  
The experimental and control groups were not equated by randomization in the 
organization. 
The data analysis employed repeated measures of ANOVA to determine if 
voluntariness in following the information security policy resulted in different 
consequences of actions taken by employees. If different consequences of actions taken 
by employees were detected, the analysis also ascertained the impact on overall design 
effectiveness. 
  
3.7.4  Analysis Procedures 
 
The following approach was used to prepare the data before analysis.  The first 
step included examining and validating the results. During data analysis, data were 
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entered into Microsoft Excel and exported to SPSS for further analysis. Any missing data 
were added using the missing data function in SPSS.  
According to Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002), quasi-experimental designs 
are effective for obtaining information on the relationships between cause and effect. 
However, this approach is not devoid of risks in regard to its validity. Shadish et al. (2002) 
proposed three principles to help overcome these threats when using a quasi-experimental 
design: 
1. Identification and evaluation of plausible threats to internal validity. 
2. Control by design.  Multiple control groups, multiple baselines, and 
statistical control as a last resort. 
3.  Coherent pattern matching. This principle involves making a complex 
prediction about a particular causal hypothesis that would leave few viable alternative 
explanations.  The logic behind this principle is that the more complex the prediction, the 
less likely that a given alternative could generate the same results (Terrell, 2012). 
Identification and evaluation of plausible threats to internal validity were conducted 
during the reliability and validity testing of the survey instrument and quasi-experimental 
design phase. 
 Regression analysis was performed to examine how well the independent 
variables explained the dependent variable (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). 
Regression models can be used to predict values on information security consequences 
(dependent variable) based on information from the (independent) variables security 
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expected benefits; happiness brought about by security actions; universalizability by 
security actions; and voluntariness. 
Overall Model Fit (F-Test):  Was employed to ascertain if it is more beneficial to use the 
regression model rather than only the mean of the dependent variable. Additionally, 
calculations of the overall sample level of mean scores for all Likert-scaled items were 
reported. 
3.7.5  Methods of Analysis  
 
Descriptive statistics, and repeated measures ANOVA were used as tools to test 
hypotheses. The three hypotheses in this study were tested using the t-test to determine 
the significant difference between the means scores of the pretest and posttest treatments 
of the participants in order to find out if the results were statistically significant at 
Cronbach’s α 0.05 levels. The focus of the hypotheses was the difference between 
variables of interest. Hypotheses H1 through H3 were tested to determine the degree of 
significance and, specifically, whether this difference was greater than would be expected 
by chance. Given that hypotheses H1 through H3 compare two variables, inferential 
statistical methods were also applied (Creswell 2008). The hypothesis H1 through H3 
were then analyzed using t-test. The t-test, t-value and standard error of the difference 
were used to assess whether the means of the two groups (A & B) were statistically 
different from each other (Terrell, 2012). A pretest was used in this study because the 
control group and treatment group needed to be examined for equality, as group selection 
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was not random and groups may have had preexisting differences (Campbell & Stanley, 
1963). Results from the t-test were examined for significant and insignificant differences 
between the two groups on the pretest. In order to test the three hypothesis, H1, H2 and 
H3, an Cronbach’s α level of p <0.05 were used. 
ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) is an extension of ANOVA and was used to 
examine whether group means (categorical independent variable) differed on the 
information security consequence (ISC) dependent variable after statistical control for 
another continuous variables (covariate). The analysis was accomplished through the 
selection of general linear model (GLM) procedures and repeated measures ANOVA 
(Nelder & Wedderburn, 1972). 
 The results of the survey from the pre-test and post-test groups were analyzed 
using the SPSS-computer-statistical analysis program. Both descriptive and inferential 
statistical analysis techniques were used to identify any relationships and group 
differences in scores on the survey items and Likert scale scores. In order to determine if 
a linear relationship existed between dependent variables for each group, a scatterplot 
was generated to confirm linearity assumptions. A Pearson’s correlation was conducted 
to examine multicollinearity among the dependent variables (Cohen, Cohen, West & 
Aiken, 2003; Harrell, 2001; Myers, 1990). According to Cohen et al., statistics aid 
researchers in excluding the significant risk that the soundness of the results of an 
experiment could be attributable to probability instead of actual dissimilarities in the test 
group. Additional statistics were run to assess normality and univariate outliers, in which 
histograms and boxplots were examined to ensure that any that noted dissimilarities were 
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not the result of a recording error. The confidence level setup for the analysis was set to 
0.5 to decrease the chances of making a type I error. Univariate analyses of variance for 
each dependent variable were conducted as follow-up tests, using the Bonferroni method 
for controlling Type I error rates for multiple comparisons and were tested at a 
significance level of 0.5. 
 
3.7.6   Internal and External Validity 
 
Internal validity refers to the degree to which the independent variables may 
impact the differences detected in the dependent variables.  Another possible threat to 
internal validity is the extraneous variables. If these variables are not controlled, their 
results may mistakenly appear to be attributable to the effects of the experiment itself.  
External validity indicates how significantly the scope of a study’s findings may 
accurately or inaccurately affect the generalizability (applicability) of those findings 
outside of the sample. Threats to external validity are helpful in determining how errors 
may be made in the generalizing of the findings of a study.  
Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) seminal paper served as the designated basis for 
the description of possible threats to the internal and external accuracy of the findings of 
this study, based on its research design. The following table provides a definition of each 
threat present and its manner of being controlled for internal validity. 
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Table 4. Threats to Internal Validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) 
 
Threats to Internal Validity Presence Control of Threat 
  Yes / No 
 
History 
 
 
Events, other than the 
experimental treatments, influence 
results. 
 Keep a list of 
dropouts in  
both treatment and  
control groups 
 
Maturation 
 
During the study, psychological 
changes occur within participants 
 Control variables, 
nonrandom sampling 
 
Testing 
 
Exposure to a pretest or 
intervening assessment influences 
performance on a posttest. 
 Will use ANCOVA 
to adjust pretest 
scores 
 
Instrumentation 
 
 
 
Testing instruments or conditions 
are inconsistent; or pretest and 
posttest are not equivalent, 
creating an illusory change in 
performance. 
 Examination of data 
sources over study 
period 
 
Statistical 
Regression 
 
Scores of participants that are very 
high or very low tend to regress 
towards the mean during retesting. 
 Three or more 
observation points, 
nonrandom sampling 
 
Selection 
 
Systematic differences exist in 
participants’ characteristics 
between treatment groups. 
 Evaluation of 
sampling criteria 
 
Experimental 
Mortality 
 
Participant attrition may bias the 
results. 
 Comparisons 
between retained 
and lost participants 
 
Diffusion of 
Treatments 
 
Implementation of one condition 
influences participants in another 
condition. 
 Participants in the  
control group will 
receive treatment at 
a different date 
Interaction 
effect of 
selection biases 
and treatment 
Sample not representative of the 
population i.e. not selected 
randomly 
 Non-random 
assignment will be 
used 
Reactive 
experimental 
arrangements 
Participants’ knowledge of 
participating in experiment may 
affect their responses 
 Will not control 
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The following table provides a definition of each threat present and its manner of being 
controlled for external validity. 
 
Table 5. Threats to External Validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) 
 
 
Threats to External Validity Presence Control of Threat 
  Yes / No 
 
Interaction of 
testing and 
treatment 
 
The interaction of testing with 
treatment 
 A pretest is not used 
on the experimental 
group. 
Interaction of 
selection and 
treatment 
The interaction of treatments with 
treatment 
 The population is 
described in the 
research study. A 
statistical technique 
such as ANCOVA is 
used, in conjunction   
with quasi-
experimental design. 
Reactive 
arrangements 
Tests of significance for this 
design 
 No lab setting is 
used. A control 
group and an 
experimental group 
are used. 
Multiple-
treatment 
interference 
Multiple treatments are given to 
the same participants 
 No multiple 
treatments are given. 
 
3.7.7 Results 
 
Results from the data analysis and interpretation are described in Chapter Four. 
Bivariate and multivariate analyses were performed on the data. 
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3.8 Phase 5 – Conclusion. 
 
 
A design-science research methodology was applied in order to achieve the 
research study objective of designing an information security policy that is effective in 
exceptional situations. As the final process of the research study, this phase disclosed the 
results and contributions of the experiment, including the artifact design and all 
additional knowledge regarding the design process, such as construction and evaluation. 
The output of this phase was an acceptable research contribution. The conclusion phase 
indicated termination of the design project. The design-science research results were 
published and communicated to technical and management audiences (Hevner et al., 
2004). 
 
3.9 Miscellaneous 
 
 
3.9.1  Limitations 
 
 
This study was limited to full-time and part-time employees who worked in the 
following departments of a single organization: information systems and technology; 
human resources; finance; legal; and corporate communications. The priorities of the 
study were to determine if and why employees violated or complied with an information 
security policy in exceptional situations based on the application principles—net benefits, 
overall adherence to security objectives, and universality of actions— of the prima-facie, 
utilitarian and universalizability design theories. In terms of generalizability, the study 
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was limited to the adult population with the general exclusion of adults who were at or 
beyond retirement age. However, the study sample was represented a diverse range of 
ages in the adult population. All of the participants in the study were chosen on a 
volunteer basis and retained the right to withdraw at any point in time. Therefore, the 
participants who completed the study may not accurately represent the adult population 
(Creswell, 2008). 
The participants in this experiment were asked to engage in an analysis-of-attitude 
survey using independent and dependent variables that were intended to gauge the 
participant’s actions instead of the participant’s opinions. Although it was anonymous, 
this study may have been limited by the participant’s subjectivity or deceptive responses. 
In addition, the study was not intended to use a self-directed learning readiness scale or to 
determine the qualities or elements that promoted the participant’s fulfillment in life. 
Rather, it determined how significant or valuable the participants considered certain 
assets and attributes in contributing to their happiness or satisfaction in life.  
The study consisted of pre-test and post-test experimental exercises. However, 
because quantitative research is generally inflexible and employs brief dialog sessions, it 
is susceptible to inaccuracies if the study is not conducted accurately. In addition, the 
participant’s moral principles or unwillingness to comply can interfere with the 
successful execution of the experiment. Finally, if the sampling and weighting of a 
quantitative experiment are mishandled, the accuracy and findings of the study may be 
jeopardized. 
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There is the possibility of bias in the data generated by the study because it was 
conducted at the researcher’s place of employment and because participants may not 
respond accurately when they are aware that they are participating in an experiment. The 
participants may also have considered some of the terminology in the study to be 
ambiguous or obscure in meaning, making it difficult for them to accurately assess their 
responses to certain questions.  
Additionally, even though employees may believe that an information security 
policy is important; their actions are not always reconciled with this belief. Therefore, it 
is possible that a participant may not behave as indicated in a response if he or she is 
faced with that situation in the actual workplace. 
 
3.9.2  Delimitations 
 
The effectiveness of design theories other than the prima-facie, utilitarian and 
universalizability design theories are beyond the scope of this study.  Additionally, this 
study did not intended to examine employee compliance with an information security 
policy under normal or stable circumstances or determine the frequency with which 
employees or organizations encounter exceptional situations (Siponen, & Vance,2010; 
Zafar, & Clark, 2009). 
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Chapter 4 
Results of repeated measures ANOVA Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters presented, outlined and discussed the research 
methodology, quasi experiment, data gathering techniques and the methods used to show 
and analyze the gathered data. This chapter details the results of those phases. 
 
4.2 Data Preparation 
 
Prior to analysis, the data were prepared to assure they would accurately execute 
within the SPSS software. First, the results gathered from the questionnaires were 
examined and validated. Second, the data were entered from the questionnaires into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and exported to an SPSS tool.  The pretest and posttest data 
collected from group A and group B were coded and entered into SPSS version 23.0 for 
descriptive statistical analyses and interpretation. Participant responses to statements 
based on a Likert scale were considered as ordinal variables and assigned codes.  Code 1 
represented “strongly disagree” while code 5 represented “strongly agree.” Third, any 
missing data were added using the missing data function in the SPSS tool. This format 
was deemed closest to the data cleaning input in the SPSS tool. The data collected from 
the pre-intervention test and the post-intervention test were analyzed by descriptive 
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statistics. The results on the given questions in both the pretest and the posttest were 
analyzed. 
. 
4.3 Demographic Findings 
 
Of the 32 participants' total responses utilized within this quasi-experimental 
study, 15 points of demographic data were collected. Participants were initially asked to 
identify their gender. Of the participants, 65.6% identified as male and 34.4% identified 
as female. Table 6 below presents the gender distribution of the questionnaire 
participants. 
Table 6. Gender Distribution 
 
 
Gender 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
 
Male 
 
21 
 
65.6 
Female 11 34.4 
 
 
 
Next, participants were asked to identify their age group. None of the participants 
were in the 18-30 age group; 15.6% of participants identified themselves as members of 
the 30-39 age group; 34.4% of participants identified themselves as members of the 40-
49 age group; and 50% of participants identified themselves as members of the 50-65 age 
group. Table 7 shows the age distribution of the questionnaire participants. 
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Table 7. Age Distribution 
 
 
Age 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
 
18-29 
30-39 
 
0 
5 
 
0.0 
15.6 
40-49 
50-65 
11 
16 
34.4 
50.0 
   
 
 
Participants were also asked to describe their highest completed level of 
education. Of the participants, 9.4% responded that they had completed high school; 
18.8% responded that they had completed an Associate’s degree; 53.1% responded with 
completion of a Bachelor’s degree; 18.8% responded with completion of a Master’s 
degree; and none of the participants responded that they had earned a Doctorate degree. 
Table 8 presents the education level distribution of the questionnaire participants. 
 
Table 8. Education Level Distribution 
 
 
Age 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
 
High School 
AA/AS 
 
3 
6 
 
9.4 
18.8 
BA/BS 
MA/MS 
PhD 
17 
16 
0 
53.1 
18.8 
0 
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Participants were also asked to describe their highest completed level of 
education. Of the participants, 9.4% responded that they had completed high school; 
18.8% responded that they had completed an Associate’s degree; 53.1% responded with 
completion of a Bachelor’s degree; 18.8% responded with completion of a Master’s 
degree; and none of the participants responded that they had earned a Doctorate degree. 
Table 9 presents the security certification level distribution of the questionnaire 
participants. 
 
Table 9. Security Certification Distribution 
 
 
 
Age 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
 
CISSP 
 
0 
 
0 
CISM 
CISA 
OTHER 
NONE 
0 
2 
5 
25 
0 
6.3 
15.6 
78.1 
   
 
 
4.4 Findings 
 
The effectiveness of design theories other than the prima-facie, utilitarian and 
universalizability design theories are beyond the scope of this study. Cronbach’s α was 
calculated at 0.719, suggesting an acceptable reliability coefficient among the items 
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tested. The design model demonstrated internal consistency through Cronbach’s α. The 
table 10 represents the Cronbach’s α reliability coefficient. 
Table 10.  Cronbach’s alpha 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.719 .656 18 
 
The pre-test and post-test activity included concurrent administration of identical 
questionnaires to both Group A (treatment) and Group B (control group - no treatment). 
The goal of the pre-test questionnaire was to examine the participants' first reactions to 
the concepts of voluntariness; security-expected benefits; happiness brought about by 
security actions; universalizability by security actions; and attitudes. The results then 
served as a foundation upon which to base comparisons for the intervention's outcome 
and effects.  The purpose of the post-test questionnaire was to examine the direct 
consequences of the intervention on participants’ voluntariness; security expected 
benefits; happiness brought about by security actions; universalizability by security 
actions; and attitudes. The contents of the pretest and posttest questionnaires were 
identical. A paired-samples t-test was used to compare the mean scores of the pretest 
treatment group A and posttest control group B.  The table 11 shows results at .000 Sig. 
(2-tailed) and the significant level is less than .05. 
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Table 11.  Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Samples Test 
  
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 Group - 
Participant -7.000 4.711 .833 -8.698 -5.302 -8.405 31 .000 
 
The results show that at .000 Sig. (2-tailed), the significant level is less than .05, 
and the difference is significant. 
 
For H1, a comparison of the mean of the six prima-facie questions of each 
treatment was completed. Using a paired t-test, the data support H1 with a p value <= 
0.000. The results from hypothesis H1 show that when participants used the design 
artifact treatment, they were able to answer all six questions pertaining to the prima-facie 
in contrast to those who did not receive the treatment. 
Table 12.  H1 Prima Facie 
 
One-Sample Test 
  
Test Value = 0 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
H1 20.003 31 .000 13.37500 12.0113 14.7387 
 
For H2, a comparison of the mean of the six utilitarian questions of each 
treatment was completed. Using a paired t-test, the data support H2 with a p value <= 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000. The results from hypothesis H2 show that when participants used the design 
artifact treatment, they were able to answer all six questions pertaining to utilitarian 
theory hypotheses in contrast to those who did not receive the treatment. 
 
Table 13.  H2 Utilitarian 
 
One-Sample Test 
  
Test Value = 0 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
H2 20.003 31 .000 13.37500 12.0113 14.7387 
 
 
For H3, a comparison of the mean of the six universalizability questions of each 
treatment was completed. Using a paired t-test, the data support H3 with a p value <= 
0.000. The results from hypothesis H3 show that when participants used the design 
artifact treatment, they were able to answer all six questions pertaining to the 
universalizability theory in contrast to those who did not receive the treatment. 
 
Table 14.  H3 Universalizability 
 
One-Sample Test 
  
Test Value = 0 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
H3 20.003 31 .000 13.37500 12.0113 14.7387 
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4.5 Summary 
 
The effectiveness of design theories other than the prima-facie, utilitarian and 
universalizability design theories are beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Table 15.  Hypotheses Results 
 
Hypotheses Results 
 
H1: If the employees’ voluntarism and the expected benefits of 
noncompliance increase, then an organization will experience fewer 
consequences in response to employee noncompliance in exceptional 
situations. 
 
 
Supported 
 
H2: If the employees' voluntarism and happiness of noncompliance increase, 
then an organization will experience fewer consequences in response to 
employee noncompliance in exceptional situations. 
 
 
Supported 
 
H3: If the employees' voluntarism and universalizability of noncompliance 
increase, then an organization will experience fewer consequences in 
response to employee noncompliance in exceptional situations. 
 
 
Supported 
 
Results show that all three hypotheses - H1, H2, and H3 - are supported. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the conclusion of the research study and includes a 
summary of the findings. It further outlines recommendations for future research studies. 
Limitations in this research study have been presented in a separate section. 
 
5.2 Findings - Contributions 
 
The contribution of this study is to use the design science research method and to 
provide a design science artifact to practitioners and scholars to design effective 
information security policies in exceptional situations in emergent organizations. 
The scope of the methodologies, settings and goals of IS information security 
research is continually increasing. To increase its hypothetical, scholarly and scientific 
base, IS information security research also needs to expand to include participation and 
research developments from other fields of study. The difficulty faced by researchers is 
that attaining significant contributions from other disciplines is a complicated process. 
Researchers must be aware of changes that are occurring in all aspects of the IS 
information security research field and how these changes may affect the interaction 
between relevant disciplines. 
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Based on the analysis of fit the model for designing an effective information 
security policy for exceptional situations in an organization was determine to be a success 
model. 
It was discovered in the posttest that there was an increase in the scores of the 
employees’ voluntarism across the three design theories. This could be attributed to the 
use of the three design theories to develop an effective information security policy. These 
findings can be significant to practitioners who seek to develop an effective information 
security policy in exceptional situations. Indeed, the results of this study implied that the 
questionnaire, and the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories used 
by the researcher were effective tools for designing an effective information security 
policy in exceptional situations in an organization. This finding agrees with the works of 
Siponen and Iivari (2006) and confirmed the recommendation of the use of the prima-
facie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories in designing effective information 
security policies. Although all information security policies must contain some non-
normative elements, the following analogy helps to clarify how a policy based primarily 
on normative standards can aid employees in making choices that are the most 
advantageous to an organization, particularly when those choices need to be made swiftly 
and decisively. Findings in the study show employees need a degree of voluntarism to 
violate information security policies for the greatest benefit of the organization in 
exceptional situations. 
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These findings also indicate that designing an information security policy with the 
three elements of a kernel theory basis; application principles from that kernel theory 
specifying how employees should manage exceptional situations; and hypotheses that can 
be tested can assist in advancing the continued effectiveness of information security 
policies that may arise in an exceptional situation (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). 
In conclusion it could be strongly affirmed that the use of application and 
effectiveness of design science approach to information security of the prima-facie, 
utilitarian and universalizability design theories are key when developing an effective 
information security policy for exceptional situations in an organization. The method to 
apply these three design principles and develop security policy provided rigorous testing 
and empirical support to design theories for information security policy proposed by 
Siponen and Iivari (2006). 
 
5.3 Implications  
 
 
The information security policy design approach contributes to the IS knowledge 
base by shrinking the existing research gap in the design of information security policies 
in exceptional situations in emergent organizations. This approach provides a 
methodology that incorporates kernel-theory requirements and constraints into the 
analysis and design phases and considers meta-policies as functional security 
requirements. This approach also supplies practitioners with a method that can be used to 
develop and design an information security policy in exceptional situations in emergent 
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organizations. Organizations and practitioners would benefit from designing effective 
information security policies. The design instantiation artifact can help practitioners to 
design effective information security policies in exceptional situations in emergent 
organizations to improve the general state of information security. Hevner et al. (2004) 
suggest the use of a sequential research process that involves determining a pertinent 
business problem that the design of an IT artifact can resolve and evaluating the artifact 
with the proper methodologies so that it can be added to the IS knowledge base. 
 
5.4 Limitations 
 
The main limitations were that the study focus only on normative theories and 
only 32 participants from one organization participate in testing. The primary barrier in 
this research study was the difficulty in designing an information security policy that 
analyzed or accounted for the motivations that caused employees to comply with or 
violate the terms of the policy in exceptional situations. In order to determine if an 
information security policy design process and the application principles that focus on 
clarity, comprehensiveness, flexibility and usability regarding guidelines for handling 
exceptional situations were effective, a design science research approach needed to be 
followed (Hevner, 2004). Without any guidelines to follow when exceptional situations 
arise, an employee is liable to take actions that compromise the CIA of an organization’s 
data or cause the organization to miss out on lucrative business prospects (Siponen & 
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Iivari, 2006). The issue of employee noncompliance with an information security policy 
is of fundamental importance to organizations and their information security experts. 
 
5.5 Recommendations for future research 
 
In designing future studies, the following suggestions may be considered. 
a. Future research should explore of other theories for design. 
b. Future research should study a much larger population size. Increasing the 
sample size would enhance the validity of the findings. 
c.  Future research should examine the economics of employees’ deliberate 
violations of information security policies in exceptional situations in emergent 
organizations. 
The proposed future research studies will encourage further research that will 
offer valuable insights to practitioners and scholars in the area of designing 
effective information security policies in emergent organizations. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This study built upon Siponen & Iivari (2006) and Hevner, March, Park and Ram 
(2004) to develop a model for designing an effective information security policy for 
exceptional situations in an organization. The results significantly increase the 
understanding of the importance of designing an effective information security policy in 
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exceptional situations and provide empirical direction to practitioners on how to achieve 
this goal. 
Many organizations fail to develop and administer an information security policy 
that analyzes or accounts for the motivations that cause employees to comply with or 
violate the terms of the policy in exceptional situations. As a result, employees may be 
left with a lack of direction or independence in taking the actions that are the most 
beneficial for an organization. This, in turn, can lead employees to make choices that 
endanger an organization’s information assets. Employees may be faced with the conflict 
of having to violate the terms of an information security policy in order to satisfy a 
client’s unanticipated request in a timely manner. Even if violating the policy provides 
advantages for the organization that outweigh those of adhering to it, an employee may 
decide that it is best to strictly comply with the information security policy if he or she is 
provided with no guidance or flexibility in determining how to handle exceptional 
situations. Therefore, it is in the best interests of an organization to develop and 
implement an information security policy that provides employees with guidelines on 
how to deal with exceptional situations and grants them a degree of voluntariness in 
adhering to those guidelines, particularly in cases where the terms of the policy contradict 
the organization’s business goals and objectives. 
Information security policies need to be designed to provide clarity, flexibility and 
usability to employees whether they violate the policy, intend to comply with it or do 
comply with it during exceptional situations that address the impact of the perceived 
benefits of non-compliance. The research study demonstrated how a design science 
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research approach can be useful not only for the design of IS information security 
policies but also for the design of a research instrument to study exceptional situations in 
the implementation of IS information security policies. This study uses a design science 
research (Hevner et al., 2004) approach that readily lends itself to the need for 
information security research that equally supports the critical elements of rigor and 
relevance. The caution and detail used in the methodologies and tools of design science 
research aid researchers in developing a more distinct and refined approach to the 
research problem and solution space prior to beginning substantive studies. 
In order to develop additional processes and procedures for creating research 
instruments that aid in the design of information security policies in exceptional 
situations, it is necessary to evaluate, compare and contrast various research techniques. 
Information gleaned from the design science research field in IS is valuable in 
ascertaining the stringent development of research tools that provide highly effective  
results for determining research methods and practices to use in the design of information 
security policies in exceptional situations. 
 The results of this study suggest that design science research principles and 
kernel theory techniques provide clarity, comprehensiveness, ease of use and flexibility to 
influence practitioners when designing and implementing information security policies in 
exceptional situations in emergent organizations. Therefore an important factor to take 
into account is that the design, development and implementation of information security 
policies that allow deliberate violations of their terms by employees in emergent 
organizations decreases the information security consequences in exceptional situations. 
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Appendix A 
 
Hypothetical Scenario: 
“Jack works in a software house, which has strict security rules laid down by a senior 
security specialist, who is regarded as the authority figure in security matters. The 
security policy includes a rule that states that passwords are personal and that one’s 
password cannot be given to anybody else. Any exception must be approved by the 
senior security specialist. During the summer, while the senior security specialist and 
most of the developers are on their holidays, Jack and a few of his co-workers receive 
additional requirements for feature changes from an important customer. Jack needs to 
make changes to the software quickly in order to keep to the deadline. To do this, Jack 
needs to access some files to which he currently does not have access (access can be 
granted by a developer, who is on his holiday at that time, and the security specialist or 
his subordinates). Jack cannot reach the senior security specialist at that time, and the 
developer who has control over the files is also on holiday. He is available, but cannot 
remember his password any more (he forgot it while on holiday). Jack contacts Matt, who 
is a subordinate of the senior security specialist, but Matt wonders if he dares to violate 
the IS security policy of the organization. If Matt does not grant access to Jack, the result 
is that the software company will miss the deadline, which further results in the software 
company having to compensate the client financially. This may further damage the 
reputation of the software company, which in turn may reduce future contracts, and lead 
to other consequences.” 
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Appendix B 
 
Survey Questionnaire: 
Please read each statement; then indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the 
statement as it relates to the hypothetical scenario by selecting the appropriate answer. 
 
Gender: 
Male: ___ Female: ___ 
Age:  
 
18 – 29 ____ 30 – 39 ____ 40 – 49 ____ 50 – 65 ____  
 
Educational Level: 
 
High School ____ AA/AS ____ BA/BS ____ MA/MS ____ Doctorate ____  
 
Security Certification: 
 
CISSP ____ CISM ____ CISA ____ Other ____ 
 
 
 
    Strongly Agree  
 
 
 
 
 
   Agree  
 
 
 
 
  Uncertain  
 
 
 
 Disagree  
 
 
Strongly disagree  
       
 
 
1. If I was Matt I would dare to violate the information 
security policy in the described hypothetical scenario. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. If I were absolutely sure that the benefits of violating 
the IS security policy and guidelines in the example 
situation would exceed the costs, I would be ready to 
violate the policy and guidelines. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. It is okay to violate the company information security 
policy if no damage is done to the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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4. It is acceptable to violate a company information 
security policy to get a job done. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. If you were the president of the organization, would you 
allow violation of the IS security policy by any 
trustworthy member of the project group in order to 
speed up software development? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. It would cause problems in my life if I jeopardized my 
future job promotion prospects for taking the actions 
that Jack did in the hypothetical scenario. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. It would cause problems in your life if you were formally 
sanctioned for taking the actions that Jack did in the 
hypothetical scenario. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I feel that general adherence to my company’s 
information security policy compensates for 
occasionally violating its terms. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I feel my hard work in the company compensates for 
occasionally violating an information security policy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. It is okay to violate the company information security 
policy when you are in a hurry. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I would be unhappy if others knew that I had violated a 
company’s information security policy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. It would cause me problems if I felt unhappy that 
managers knew that I had violated the company 
information security policy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I would be unhappy if team members knew that I had 
violated a company’s information security policy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. It is acceptable to violate the company information 
security policy if circumstances seem to offer you little 
other choice. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. It is okay to violate the company information security 
policy if no harm is done to me or to another colleague. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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16. If I knew that violation of IS security policy and 
guidelines in the example situation represented just 
and honest action, I would be ready to violate the policy 
and guidelines. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. If the proposed action does not comply with Company 
policy, but lead to business success, would you violate 
the IS security policy? 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. It is not as wrong to violate a company information 
security policy that is not reasonable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
The following table depicts the how each question is linked to hypotheses and research 
model. 
 
Question Number Hypotheses Design Theory 
1 H1  
 
 
Prima-Facie 
2 H1 
3 H1 
4 H1 
5 H1 
6 H1 
7 H2  
 
Utilitarian 
8 H2 
9 H2 
10 H2 
11 H2 
12 H2 
13 H3  
 
Universalizability 
14 H3 
15 H3 
16 H3 
17 H3 
18 H3 
 
 
 
